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VARSITY BRANDS, INC. v. STAR ATHLETICA, LLC
 “[C]opyright law reform is slow, broad-based, and premised on a one-size-fits-all 
approach . . . .”1 Such an approach is problematic to copyright law because it disrupts a 
court’s ability to focus on specific characteristics of individual works. It fails to consider 
the presence or absence of the particular traits that ultimately determine a work’s 
copyrightability.2
 Broad, court-created tests used to determine the copyrightability of two-
dimensional pictorial, graphic, or sculptural (PGS) works do not apply equally to all 
works found within an artistic category. Creating tests of this nature3 can lead to 
inconsistent copyright protection for two-dimensional PGS works,4 and functionally 
limit the scope of protection because categorizing original works into generic groups 
overlooks the very traits that may render a work copyrightable. This approach to 
copyrightability contradicts the purpose of the Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Act”), 
which is to afford consistent protection to “original works of authorship fixed in any 
tangible medium of expression.”5 While it is easier to create broad, vague tests than 
narrowly tailored ones,6 the detriment of broadness and vagueness to furthering the 
Act’s purpose should impel more individualized inquiries.
 In Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, a case involving PGS works, the 
plaintiff sued the defendant for copyright infringement when the defendant sold 
merchandise incorporating designs that were substantially similar to those found on 
the plaintiff ’s products.7 The Sixth Circuit held that the fabric designs on the 
plaintiff ’s cheerleading uniforms were copyrightable because they were conceptually 
1. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Stewarding the Common Law of Copyright, 60 J. Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 
103, 104 (2013).
2. “Copyrightability” is a term of art that is derived from the Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2012). 
A work is copyrightable, and is thus protected under the Act, when it is both original and fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression. Id.
3. Infra pp. 244–46.
4. Compare Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that the plaintiff ’s animal mannequins were copyrightable because their utilitarian purpose 
was conceptually separable from the sculptural features, which ref lected the plaintiff ’s artistic 
judgment), and Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that 
the appellant’s belt buckles were conceptually separable from their utilitarian function and therefore 
copyrightable), with Brandir Int’l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987) 
(determining that a bicycle rack was not copyrightable because the aesthetic elements were not 
conceptually separable from the utilitarian elements), and Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 
773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that mannequins of partial human torsos were not conceptually 
separable from their utilitarian function, and therefore not copyrightable).
5. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
6. See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 487 (6th Cir. 2015) (“These cases  .  .  . 
illustrate that it is difficult to select one approach to the question whether an artistic design is conceptually 
separable from the utilitarian aspects of the article. We adopt a similar hybrid approach now.”).
7. Id. at 470–75.
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separable8 from the intrinsic utilitarian function9 of the uniforms.10 The court created 
and applied a hybrid approach that combined various conceptual separability tests 
utilized by other circuits and scholars.11
 This case comment contends that although the Sixth Circuit reached the proper 
conclusion, it erred when it created and applied a hybrid conceptual separability test. 
The subjective nature12 of the hybrid test13 makes it an inferior approach to determine 
conceptual separability; several other straightforward, objective tests were already in 
use in the courts.14 The court should have adopted the primary-subsidiary test set 
8. “Conceptual separability” is a term of art derived from the definition of PGS works in the Act that 
refers to a PGS work’s separate and distinct identity. See 17 U.S.C. § 101. “Conceptual separability 
means that a feature of the useful article is clearly recognizable as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural 
work, notwithstanding the fact that it cannot be physically separated from the article by ordinary 
means.” Varsity, 799 F.3d at 483 (quoting U.S. Copyright Office, Compendium of U.S. Copyright 
Office Practices § 924.2(B) (3d ed. 2014)). Courts focus extensively on this analysis because if the 
design of an article is not separable from its utilitarian function, the design is not copyrightable under 
the Act. See Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. 2005); Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. 
Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913 (7th Cir. 2004); Carol Barnhart, 773 F.2d 411; Jovani Fashion, Ltd. 
v. Cinderella Divine, Inc., 808 F. Supp. 2d 542 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
9. The Act does not define the term “utilitarian function.” See 17 U.S.C. § 101. However, it defines “useful 
article” as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance 
of the article or to convey information.” Id. According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the term 
“utilitarian” means “made to be useful rather than to be decorative or comfortable.” Utilitarian, Merriam-
Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/utilitarian (last visited Feb. 6, 2017). What 
constitutes an object’s “utilitarian function” is fact specific and depends on the object’s basic function. For 
example, the Fourth Circuit stated in Superior Form Builders:
The objective in designing a chair is to create a utilitarian object, albeit an aesthetically 
pleasing one; the objective in creating a statue of a dancer is to express the idea of a 
dancer. As the Act makes the distinction, a useful article has as its function something 
more than portraying its own appearance.
 74 F.3d at 493.
10. Varsity, 799 F.3d at 492.
11. Id. at 487–89; see infra note 41 and text accompanying notes 41–47.
12. Hybrid tests are subjective in nature because they comprise multiple tests. See infra note 13; see also James 
G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test Continuum, 27 Ariz. St. L.J. 
773, 801 n.128 (1995) (“The Court must engage in a meta-subjective balancing test to determine which 
factors, objective and subjective, to include in its final formulation of doctrine.”). Courts are left to 
determine which individual tests within a hybrid bear more weight in any individual case; this requires a 
degree of subjective judgment. See infra pp. 252–53, for a discussion about the policy implications of the 
Varsity court’s decision to utilize a hybrid approach to conceptual separability.
13. Hybrid tests are different from balancing tests. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “balancing test” as “[a] 
doctrine whereby an adjudicator measures competing interests and decides which interest should 
prevail.” Balancing Test, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). Hybrid tests are a combination of 
multiple theories or preexisting tests. Wilson, supra note 12, at 773. Each preexisting test has different 
factors that contribute to the legal analysis. Balancing tests are individual tests with different components 
that factor into a legal analysis. See generally id. (discussing different tests utilized by courts). Any factor 
may be given more weight in a given case but all factors are part of the same test. Id. at 805 & n.148.
14. For a list and explanation of the nine objective tests that existed at the time of the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision, see infra note 41.
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forth by the Second Circuit in Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc.,15 limiting 
the test’s application to garment designs. Had the court done so, it also would have 
avoided issues pertaining to the aesthetic nondiscrimination principle16 because the 
primary-subsidiary test focuses on the relationship between a work’s artistic features 
and its utilitarian function.17 The Sixth Circuit’s new hybrid test establishes confusing 
precedent that will yield inconsistent results and create unnecessary complexity in 
the conceptual separability arena.18
 Varsity Brands, Inc. (“Varsity”) is a Tennessee-based company that designs and 
manufactures cheerleading uniforms.19 Varsity’s designers sketch “original combinations, 
positionings, and arrangements of elements which include V’s (chevrons), lines, curves, 
stripes, angles, diagonals, inverted V’s, coloring, and shapes.”20 Varsity uses one of four 
methods to transfer the designs onto the fabric: “‘cutting and sewing panels of fabric 
and braid together’; sublimation; embroidery; or screen printing.”21 After manufacturing 
is complete, Varsity sells its merchandise online and in catalogs.22 Varsity holds 
copyrights for many of its two-dimensional designs, including those at issue in the 
instant case.23
 Star Athletica, LLC (“Star”) also markets and sells sports uniforms and athletic 
apparel for cheerleading, basketball, football, lacrosse, and baseball,24 and utilizes 
similar marketing techniques.25 After seeing the advertisements of Star’s 2010 
designs, Varsity sued in the Western District of Tennessee alleging copyright 
infringement against Star under the Act. 26 Varsity claimed that Star sold, distributed, 
15. 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
16. For an explanation of this principle, see infra note 92. See also Donald S. Chisum et al., 
Understanding Intellectual Property Law § 4C[1][d] (2d ed. 2011) (discussing the aesthetic 
nondiscrimination principle). 
17. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993–94.
18. Robert Kirk Walker & Ben Depoorter, Unavoidable Aesthetic Judgments in Copyright Law: A Community 
of Practice Standard, 109 Nw. U. L. Rev. 343, 367 (2015) (“[C]ourts face a difficult challenge determining 
conceptual separability. But by randomly switching between major aesthetic theories that are 
theoretically incompatible, courts make this challenge even more difficult for themselves, and as a 
consequence, the case law fails to provide artists with guidance as to the scope of protection available to 
such works.”).
19. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 471, 494 (6th Cir. 2015).
20. Id. at 471 (citation omitted).
21. Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). “Sublimation involves printing the design on a piece of paper. 
The paper is then fed through a machine that heats the ink on the paper into a gas which is infused into 
the fabric by pressing the paper and fabric together.” Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, No. 
10-2508, 2014 WL 819422, at *4 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 2014), vacated, 799 F.3d 468.
22. Varsity, 799 F.3d at 471.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 474.
25. Varsity, 2014 WL 819422, at *2.
26. Varsity, 799 F.3d at 474–75.
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and advertised cheerleading uniforms that copied and were substantially similar to 
five of its copyrighted designs.27
 In the district court, Star argued that it was entitled to summary judgment on all 
of Varsity’s claims, arguing that Varsity’s copyrights were invalid because “(1) Varsity’s 
designs are for useful articles, which are not copyrightable; and (2) the pictorial, 
graphic, and sculptural elements of Varsity’s designs were not physically or conceptually 
separable from the uniforms, making [them] ineligible for copyright protection.”28 
Varsity argued that it was entitled to summary judgment because its designs were 
nonfunctional and conceptually separable from the uniforms and therefore Star’s 
conduct constituted copyright infringement.29
 Relying on the language of the Act, the district court granted Star’s motion for 
summary judgment.30 The Act provides:
[Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works] include works of artistic craftsmanship 
insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are 
concerned; the design of a useful article  .  .  . shall be considered a pictorial, 
graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such design 
incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identified 
separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
aspects of the article.31
The Act further defines a “useful article” as “an article having an intrinsic utilitarian 
function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey 
information.”32 The district court determined that the utilitarian function of a 
cheerleading uniform is to identify oneself as a cheerleader, and the colors, shapes, 
stripes, and similar designs make the apparel recognizable as a cheerleading 
uniform.33 Therefore, the designs were fundamental to the clothing as a cheerleading 
uniform.34 The district court found that Varsity’s designs were not physically or 
conceptually separable from the uniform because they merged with the functional 
aspects of the uniform and evoked the concept of cheerleading in the viewer’s mind.35 
Thus, the court found that the designs were not copyrightable.36 Varsity appealed.37
27. Id.
28. Id. at 475.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
32. Id.
33. Varsity, 799 F.3d at 475.
34. See id.
35. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, No. 10-2508, 2014 WL 819422, at *9 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 1, 
2014), vacated, 799 F.3d 468.
36. See id.
37. Varsity, 799 F.3d at 476.
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 This case presented a question of first impression for the Sixth Circuit: What 
approach should be taken to determine whether a design’s PGS features are distinct 
and separable from the utilitarian aspects of the article on which they appear?38 
Before establishing its own test to determine the copyrightability of PGS works, the 
court started with a two-part test culled from the language of the Act: (1) whether 
the design is for a useful article; and (2) if so, whether the PGS features can be 
identified separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilitarian 
function of the article.39 “This second question is often referred to as testing the 
‘separability’ of the pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features of the design of a useful 
article.”40 The court began its analysis by describing the nine distinct approaches to 
conceptual separability utilized by other circuits and scholars.41
 The Sixth Circuit then established its own five-pronged test to determine 
whether a PGS design is copyrightable: (1) whether the design is a PGS work; (2) if 
it is a PGS work, whether it is a design of a useful article; (3) what are the utilitarian 
aspects of the useful article; (4) whether PGS features of the design can be identified 
38. Id. at 481.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 484 –85. The court discussed the approaches in the following order: (1) the Copyright Office’s 
approach, which provides for conceptual separability “only if the artistic feature and the useful article 
could both exist side by side and be perceived [separately],” id. at 484 (quoting U.S. Copyright Office, 
supra note 8, § 924.2(B)); (2) the primary-subsidiary approach, which states that conceptual separability 
exists “if the artistic features of the design are ‘primary’ to the ‘subsidiary utilitarian function,’” id. 
(quoting Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir. 1980)); (3) the 
objectively necessary approach, which provides that “if the artistic features of the design are not necessary 
to the performance of the utilitarian function of the article,” then the article is conceptually separable, id.; 
(4) the ordinary-observer approach, which defines conceptual separability as “creat[ing] in the mind of 
the ordinary[, reasonable] observer two different concepts that are not inevitably entertained 
simultaneously,” id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 
773 F.2d 411, 422 (2d Cir. 1985) (Newman, J., dissenting)); (5) the design-process approach, which 
provides for conceptual separability if the design elements ref lect the “designer’s artistic judgment 
exercised independently of functional influences,” id. (quoting Brandir Int’l, Inc., v. Cascade Pac. Lumber 
Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1145 (2d Cir. 1987)); (6) the stand-alone approach, which provides for conceptual 
separability if “the useful article’s functionality remain[s] intact once the copyrightable material is 
separated,” id. (alteration in original) (quoting Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 
913, 934 (7th Cir. 2004) (Kanne, J., dissenting)); (7) the likelihood-of-marketability approach, which 
states that conceptual separability exists when, “even if the article ha[s] no utilitarian use it would still be 
marketable to some significant segment of the community simply because of its aesthetic qualities,” id. 
(quoting Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2005)); (8) Patry’s approach, 
which asks whether designs are “separable from the ‘utilitarian aspects’ of the article,” rather than the 
article itself, satisfying separability if the discernable PGS features are “capable of existing as intangible 
features independent of the utilitarian aspects of the useful article,” and are not “dictated by the form or 
function of the utilitarian aspects of the useful article,” id. at 485 (quoting 2 William F. Patry, Patry 
on Copyright § 3:146 (2015)); and (9) the subjective-objective approach, which determines separability 
by balancing the extent “to which the designer’s subjective process is motivated by aesthetic concerns [and 
the extent] to which the design  .  .  . is objectively dictated by [the article’s] utilitarian function,” id. 
(quoting Barton R. Keyes, Note, Alive and Well: The (Still) Ongoing Debate Surrounding Conceptual 
Separablility in American Copyright Law, 69 Ohio St. L.J. 109, 141 (2008)).
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separately from the utilitarian aspects of the useful article; and (5) whether the useful 
article’s PGS features can exist independently of its utilitarian aspects.42
 To answer the last prong of this test, separability, the court utilized both the 
Copyright Office’s approach and the objectively necessary approach.43 It also partially 
endorsed the design-process approach because the designer’s testimony offered insight as 
to which elements of the designs were essential to the utilitarian function of the article.44
 By drawing from these tests, the Sixth Circuit followed the general approach of 
the Second and Fourth Circuits, incorporating multiple separability doctrines into 
one analysis.45 The court emphasized the need for such an approach owing to the 
complexity of copyright cases, and commented on the difficulty of employing a single 
separability doctrine for design copyrights.46 However, instead of adopting one of the 
Second’s or Fourth Circuit’s hybrids, the Sixth Circuit created a new one of its own.47
 Applying its five-pronged test to Varsity’s designs, the Sixth Circuit concluded 
first that Varsity’s designs were two-dimensional works of graphic art.48 Second, the 
court affirmed that cheerleading uniforms do indeed have an intrinsic utilitarian 
function; they are not produced merely to “portray the appearance of [clothing] or to 
convey information.”49
 In answer to the third prong, the court rejected Star’s contention that the utilitarian 
aspect of a cheerleading uniform is to identify oneself as a cheerleader.50 The court 
determined that, while also serving a decorative function, the utilitarian aspects of a 
cheerleading uniform are to cover the body, wick away moisture, and withstand 
athletic movements.51 It reasoned that a useful article’s decorative function alone does 
not render it incapable of conceptual separability.52
42. Id. at 487–88 (citing 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–102 (2012)).
43. Id. at 488–89.
44. Id. at 488.
45. See id. at 485–87; Universal Furniture Int’l, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 618 F.3d 417 (4th Cir. 
2010) (applying the objectively necessary and design-process approaches to conceptual separability); 
Chosun Int’l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2005) (applying the objectively 
necessary, design-process, and ordinary-observer approaches to conceptual separability).
46. “These cases from the Second and Fourth Circuits illustrate that it is difficult to select one approach to 
the question whether an artistic design is conceptually separable from the utilitarian aspects of the 
article. We adopt a similar hybrid approach now.” Varsity, 799 F.3d at 487.
47. Id. at 488–89.
48. Id. at 489 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 for the proposition that PGS works include two and three-dimensional 
works of art).
49. Id. at 489–90 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012)).
50. “But this is no different than saying that a utilitarian aspect of a cheerleading uniform is to convey to 
others the fact that the wearer . . . is a cheerleader . . . .” Id. at 490 (citing 17 U.S.C. § 101 (“A ‘useful 
article’ is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to . . . convey information.”)).
51. Id.
52. The court stated: “We therefore conclude that a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work’s ‘decorative function’ 
does not render it unable to ‘be identified separately from,’ or ‘[in]capable of existing independently of, the 
utilitarian aspects of the article.’” Id. at 490–91 (alteration in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101).
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 In response to the fourth prong, the Sixth Circuit held that the graphic design 
elements could be identified separately from the utilitarian aspects of the uniform 
because they did not enhance the uniform’s functionality.53 Since different 
cheerleading uniforms contained different designs, the court reasoned that the 
functionality of the uniform does not depend on the specific design imposed on the 
clothing.54 To emphasize this point, the court explained that the interchangeability 
of these designs illustrates that the designs and the uniform could be found side by 
side, as separate and distinct concepts.55
 Finally, the court analyzed whether Varsity’s designs could exist independently of 
the utilitarian aspects of the uniforms, thereby testing the conceptual separability of 
the uniforms’ designs.56 The Sixth Circuit explained that all of Varsity’s designs 
could be imposed on different garments, including cheerleading uniforms, t-shirts, 
warm-ups, and jackets.57 Since the designs did not interfere with the way the uniform 
functioned, they were conceptually separable.58 The Sixth Circuit concluded that 
since Varsity’s designs were conceptually separable from the uniforms and not 
necessary to their utilitarian function, Varsity’s two-dimensional designs were 
copyrightable.59 Therefore, it vacated the district court’s order granting summary 
judgment to Star and remanded the case for further proceedings.60
 As courts and scholars across the nation have noted, this area of copyright law is 
difficult to resolve.61 This case comment contends that although the court ultimately 
reached the proper conclusion, the Sixth Circuit erred in its approach to conceptual 
separability. First, the court erroneously adopted a broad hybrid test for conceptual 
separability in the fifth prong of its test for the copyrightability of PGS works. 
Instead, the court should have only used the more objective primary-subsidiary test 
for conceptual separability because it would have reached the same result more 
efficiently and avoided issues of aesthetic discrimination.62 By implementing its hybrid 
approach, the Sixth Circuit created weak precedent that will yield unpredictable 
results and continued confusion in conceptual separability.





58. Id. at 492 (“We therefore conclude the arrangement of stripes, chevrons, color blocks, and zigzags are 
‘wholly unnecessary to the performance of ’ the garment’s ability to cover the body, permit free movement, 
and wick moisture.” (quoting Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Econ. Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411, 419 (2d Cir. 1985)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 493.
61. See id. at 484 (citing Robert P. Merges et al., Intellectual Property in the New Technological 
Age 490 (6th ed. 2012)); Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 669–70 (3d 
Cir. 1990).
62. See infra note 92.
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 First, the Sixth Circuit erred when it adopted a hybrid approach to determine 
conceptual separability in PGS works because nine other conceptual separability tests 
already existed.63 By adopting an approach that combined multiple legal standards, the 
court not only contributed to the complexity in copyright law, but also added unnecessary 
subjective components to the conceptual separability analysis. In fact, several U.S. 
Supreme Court dissenting and concurring opinions in numerous areas of the law have 
criticized the application of hybrid tests because they are often vague and confusing.64
 For example, in Fedorenko v. United States, the Supreme Court diverted from an 
established legal standard and instead relied on the plain language of the statutory 
exception to reach its decision.65 Justice Harry Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, 
expressed his regret over the Court’s refusal to employ the Chaunt test,66 which was 
already well-settled.67 He stated:
63. Supra note 41.
64. See Gisbrecht v. Barnhart, 535 U.S. 789, 812 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court’s 
holding because “the Court’s hybrid approach establishes no clear criteria and hence will generate 
needless satellite litigation”); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 126 (1986) (Burger, C.J., dissenting, 
joined by Rehnquist, J.) (“Rather than applying straightforward equal protection analysis, the Court 
substitutes for the holding in Swain a curious hybrid. The defendant must first establish a ‘prima facie 
case’ of invidious discrimination, then the ‘burden shifts to the State to come forward with a neutral 
explanation for challenging black jurors.’” (citations omitted)); Hillsboro Nat’l Bank v. Comm’r, 460 
U.S. 370, 417–18 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in No. 81-485 and dissenting in No. 
81-930, joined by Marshall, J.) (“[A] general inconsistent events theory would surely give more guidance 
than the vague hybrid established by the Court today. The dimensions of the Court’s newly fashioned 
‘fundamentally inconsistent event’ version of the tax benefit rule are by no means clear.”); infra notes 
65–72 and accompanying text. 
65. 449 U.S. 490 (1981). The issue in this case was whether the petitioner’s citizenship could be revoked 
under the Displaced Persons Act (DPA) of 1948. Id. at 493–95. The DPA allowed European refugees 
who were driven from their homelands to enter the United States, but it excluded those who had acted 
in concert with or in aid of enemy forces. Id. at 495. The petitioner was an armed prison guard at the 
Nazi concentration camp in Treblinka, Poland. Id. at 494. He immigrated to the United States under 
the DPA and obtained his citizenship in 1970. Id. at 496–97. In 1977, the government moved to 
denaturalize the petitioner and charged him with willfully concealing his wartime involvement, thereby 
procuring his visa and citizenship illegally or by willfully misrepresenting material facts. Id. at 497–98. 
For concealment of material evidence, the DPA provides, in pertinent part, as follows: 
It shall be the duty of the United States attorneys . . . to institute proceedings . . . for the 
purpose of revoking and setting aside the order admitting such person to citizenship 
and canceling the certificate of naturalization on the ground that such order and 
certificate of naturalization were illegally procured or were procured by concealment of a 
material fact or by willful misrepresentation . . . .
 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (2012) (emphasis added). The exception to the DPA provided that those who had 
persecuted civilians in aid of the enemy were disqualified from being eligible for visas. Fedorenko, 449 
U.S. at 510.
66. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 354–55 (1960). This test defined “material facts” in relation to 
the DPA and the revocation of a person’s citizenship. Id. The burden of proof fell on the government to 
show by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence either that the facts were suppressed and, if known, 
would have warranted denial of citizenship, or that their disclosure might have led to other facts that 
warranted denial of citizenship. Id. at 355.
67. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 519.
248
VARSITY BRANDS, INC. v. STAR ATHLETICA, LLC
In Chaunt, the Court articulated two approaches to provide guidance and 
uniformity in such inquiries. The Court today adopts what it considers a new 
and minimal definition of materiality  .  .  .  . I would rely explicitly upon the 
Chaunt test here and avoid risking the confusion that is likely to be engendered 
by multiple standards.68
Similarly, in Varsity, the Sixth Circuit passed over nine conceptual separability tests 
that were previously utilized by other circuits and created a new test.69 The Sixth 
Circuit had numerous approaches at its disposal, yet it added to the confusion in 
copyright law by creating its own hybrid test. Importantly, the Sixth Circuit failed to 
explain why a hybrid test was more practical and efficient than any of the preexisting 
tests. Much like the majority’s approach in Fedorenko, the court simply dismissed the 
opportunity to adopt and apply a preexisting test.70
 In another criticism of the Court’s decision to depart from known standards and 
employ a new hybrid test, Chief Justice William Rehnquist in Schlup v. Delo 
denounced the majority’s analysis and conclusion, stating that the Court had engaged 
in a “classic mixing of apples and oranges” when it required a showing that combined 
two prongs from different tests.71 He continued: “The hybrid which the Court serves 
up is bound to be a source of confusion. . . . [T]he sensible course would be to modify 
that familiar standard rather than to create a confusing hybrid.”72 Instead the Court 
created a different legal test, a hybrid containing components of prior standards, 
which was unnecessary because established standards already existed.
68. Id. at 520–21.
69. Although the other circuits’ approaches to conceptual separability are not binding on the Sixth Circuit, 
the Varsity court could have adopted a specific hybrid approach from another circuit to create uniformity 
in copyright law and avoid further confusion and unpredictability. Nonetheless, even if the Sixth Circuit 
adopted another circuit’s hybrid, this comment argues that it still would have been an erroneous 
approach because nine other discrete tests were available. 
70. See Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 487 (6th Cir. 2015). 
71. 513 U.S. 298, 339 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). After being charged with and convicted of 
murdering a fellow inmate, the petitioner filed a habeas corpus petition alleging that a constitutional 
error deprived the jury of crucial evidence that would have established his innocence. Id. at 301–02 
(majority opinion). In reviewing the habeas petition, the majority analyzed the Carrier and Sawyer 
standards. Id. at 318–27. The Carrier standard requires a habeas petitioner to show that the constitutional 
violation has “probably” resulted in the conviction of someone who is actually innocent. Murray v. 
Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 496 (1986). The Sawyer standard requires a petitioner to prove “by clear and 
convincing evidence that, but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have found the 
petitioner eligible for the death penalty.” Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 336 (1992). The majority 
concluded that the Carrier standard applied but added that the showing of innocence also requires proof 
that more likely than not no reasonable juror would have convicted the defendant on the basis of the 
new evidence. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 326, 327, 329. Judge Rehnquist stated:
“More likely than not” is a quintessential charge to a finder of fact, while “no reasonable 
juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evidence” is an equally 
quintessential conclusion of law similar to the standard that courts constantly employ in 
deciding motions for judgment of acquittal in criminal cases.
 Id. at 339 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
72. Schlup, 513 U.S. at 339–40 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
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 The Sixth Circuit mimicked the majority’s approach in Schlup when it took 
accepted approaches, whether in whole or in part, and combined them to formulate a 
new standard for conceptual separability. Considering the extent of ambiguity in this 
area of law,73 it is perplexing that the Sixth Circuit did not adopt an existing test, as 
Chief Justice Rehnquist recommended in Schlup. Rather, the Sixth Circuit added to 
the confusion surrounding conceptual separability by adopting a hybrid strategy, 
about which Supreme Court Justices have given ample warning and have implied that 
the more practical, clear, and efficient approach would be to apply existing standards.
 Furthermore, a single, narrowly tailored test furthers the purpose of the Act, 
benefitting authors of original works, by contemplating the specific characteristics of 
a particular category of art. “[L]imitation[s] on the scope of copyright law ha[ve] 
been used to accomplish an expansion of the subject matter of copyright.”74 Under 
this theory, if one test applies to garment designs75 and another test applies to 
mannequin faces,76 both garment designs and mannequin faces have a distinct 
conceptual separability test, which affords each broader protection under the Act.77 
This would allow courts to rely on unambiguous tests for each artistic category, 
which would afford broader protection to works as a whole.78 Had the Sixth Circuit 
done this, it would have furthered the Act’s purpose, by “promot[ing] the nation’s 
culture and learning.”79 Unambiguous and definitive tests in copyright law encourage 
creativity and authorship because they protect original works against infringement.
 Additionally, there are many practical benefits to using one test for conceptual 
separability. Judge Jerry E. Smith in Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co. stated:
Sometimes, we must favor what might be a sub-optimal prophylactic rule 
because it is more determinate than the theoretically superior but hopelessly 
subjective one. . . . [W]e do conclude that . . . it is not so theoretically infirm 
73. “How to conduct the conceptual separation is, in turn, what continues to f lummox federal courts.” 
Galiano v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 416 F.3d 411, 419 (5th Cir. 2005).
74. Edward Samuels, The Idea-Expression Dichotomy in Copyright Law, 56 Tenn. L. Rev. 321, 346 (1989).
75. See Galiano, 416 F.3d at 421.
76. Id. (“Surely the Seventh Circuit considered itself as setting forth a test for courts to use when 
encountering any applied art  but  .  .  . courts have not rushed to extend the rule beyond mannequin 
designs.”); see Pivot Point Int’l, Inc. v. Charlene Prods., Inc., 372 F.3d 913, 931 (7th Cir. 2004). 
77. Conversely, if there is one broad test that applies to both categories of subject matter, the conceptual 
separability analysis is not precise in its application. 
78. Each individual category of art in PGS works would have its own unambiguous test to determine 
conceptual separability. While definitive tests may result in less protection for a particular kind of PGS 
work, PGS works as a whole would be entitled to broader protection because there would be fewer gray 
areas when determining separability and therefore copyrightability.
79. John B. Fowles, The Utility of a Bright-Line Rule in Copyright Law: Freeing Judges from Aesthetic 
Controversy and Conceptual Separability in Leicester v. Warner Bros., 12 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 301, 305 
(2005) (citation omitted); see also L. Ray Patterson & Stanley W. Lindberg, The Nature of 
Copyright: A Law of Users’ Rights 2 (1991) (discussing the primary purpose of the Act, which is to 
promote public welfare by encouraging the public to produce and distribute new works).
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that such inferiority overcomes the benefits . . . of having a more determinate 
rule.80
A determinate test is fundamental to affording copyright protection to PGS works 
because it reduces the inherent subjectivity of conceptual separability.81 Had the 
Sixth Circuit applied a single test instead of a hybrid to determine only the conceptual 
separability of fabric designs, it would have avoided the task of attempting to apply 
this complex test to all PGS works in future cases.
 Second, the Sixth Circuit should have used the primary-subsidiary test82 as its 
single conceptual separability test for fabric designs. Under the primary-subsidiary 
test, conceptual separability exists if the design’s artistic features are primary to the 
article’s subsidiary utilitarian function.83 In Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, 
Inc., the Second Circuit held that the primary ornamental aspect of the belt buckles 
at issue was conceptually separable from the belt buckles’ subsidiary utilitarian 
function.84 Although the court did not expressly state what that function was, Judge 
Jack Weinstein’s dissenting opinion stated what the majority implied: that the 
utilitarian function of belt buckles was “to keep the tops of trousers at waist level.”85 
Therefore, the ornamental aspect of the belt buckles was primary to the subsidiary 
utilitarian function of holding pants around a person’s waist.
 Viewing the primary-subsidiary test in this light shows why it is applicable to 
fabric designs and thus applicable to the Varsity case. The Sixth Circuit recognized 
that the fabric designs served a decorative purpose,86 which is analogous to the 
Second Circuit’s holding in Kieselstein-Cord that the belt buckles also served an 
ornamental purpose.87 This illustrates the distinct relationship between the artistic 
features of the fabric designs and the uniforms’ utilitarian function. Since the 
primary-subsidiary test hinges on the distinct, separate relationship between artistic 
features and utilitarian function,88 the court should have adopted this test, clarified 
its definition,89 and limited its application to fabric designs.
80. Galiano, 416 F.3d at 421.
81. See infra pp. 251–52.
82. Supra note 41.
83. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 994 (2d Cir. 1980).
84. Id. at 993. The plaintiff designed and manufactured belt buckles with distinct sculptural elements. Id. 
at 990. The plaintiff ’s customers sometimes wore the belt buckles around the neck or elsewhere on the 
body as jewelry. Id. at 991. The plaintiff commenced a lawsuit after realizing that the defendant’s belt 
buckle designs were substantially similar to the plaintiff ’s belt buckles. See id. 
85. Id. at 994 (Weinstein, J., dissenting). Judge Weinstein, a district court judge for the Eastern District of 
New York, heard the case by designation.
86. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 490 (6th Cir. 2015).
87. Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993.
88. See generally id. (implying a relationship existed between the ornamental aspects of the belt buckles and 
their utilitarian function of holding pants at waist level).
89. The primary-subsidiary test is often criticized for its unspecific guidance in determining what is 
primary and what is subsidiary. See Fowles, supra note 79, at 313–14; Keyes, supra note 41, at 123–24; 
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 Conceptual separability is inherently subjective because it tests the balance 
between artistic features and utilitarian functions.90 As a result, the court must 
naturally make some judgment on artistic features of a work to determine whether or 
not they are separable from functional features. Despite the subjectivity in separability 
analyses, the primary-subsidiary test has objective components, as it concentrates on 
the relationship between artistic features and utilitarian functions and not the artistic 
features themselves.91 Therefore, with respect to fabric designs, this test is functionally 
superior to other conceptual separability tests because the court need only focus on 
an objective determination: the relationship between artistic features and the 
utilitarian function of the article into which the fabric designs are incorporated.
 Moreover, the primary-subsidiary test avoids issues of aesthetic discrimination.92 In 
essence, the principle instructs courts to avoid basing copyrightability determinations 
on what a judge or fact finder believes is worthy of protection.93 Copyrightability tests 
should not test the weight of how artistic or aesthetically pleasing the work is to the 
court but should instead test originality and fixation objectively.94 The primary-
subsidiary test removes the judge’s subjective determinations of a work’s value made on 
the basis of her personal aesthetic preferences, and instead relies objectively on whether 
aesthetics serve a purpose primary to the subsidiary utilitarian function of a work.95 
Sonja Wolf Sahlsten, Note, I’m a Little Treepot: Conceptual Separability and Affording Copyright Protection 
to Useful Articles, 67 Fla. L. Rev. 941, 957 (2015).
90. See Walker & Depoorter, supra note 18, at 351–53, 363 –67.
91. See Kieselstein-Cord, 632 F.2d at 993–94 (considering that the “buckles’ wearers . . . have used them as 
ornamentation for parts of the body other than the waist” and concluding that the sculptural elements 
of the belt buckles were primary to their subsidiary utilitarian function).
92. The aesthetic nondiscrimination principle originated from Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.’s famous 
passage in Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co.:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute 
themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest 
and most obvious limits. At the one extreme, some works of genius would be sure to 
miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make them repulsive until the public had 
learned the new language in which their author spoke. It may be more than doubted, 
for instance, whether the etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would have been 
sure of protection when seen for the first time. At the other end, copyright would be 
denied to pictures which appealed to a public less educated than the judge. Yet if they 
command the interest of any public, they have a commercial value,— it would be bold 
to say that they have not an aesthetic and educational value,—and the taste of any 
public is not to be treated with contempt.
 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 (1903); see also Chisum et al., supra note 16, § 4C[1][d] (explaining 
how courts generally apply this standard).
93. See supra note 92. 
94. See Bleistein, 188 U.S. 239. “To be copyrightable subject matter, a work of authorship must be fixed in a 
tangible medium of expression ‘from which [it] can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, 
either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.’” Chisum et al., supra note 16, § 4C[2] (alteration 
in original) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012)).
95. See discussion supra pp. 250–51.
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This test removes the need for aesthetic evaluation in both copyright law and conceptual 
separability, which “promote[s] objectivity and eliminate[s] questions of taste.”96
 In deciding which separability tests to implement in the Sixth Circuit, the Varsity 
court alluded to the issue of aesthetic discrimination and stated that it chose not to 
implement the likelihood-of-marketability test97 because of its subjective nature.98 By 
explicitly rejecting the subjective nature of this test, the court seemingly recognized 
that objective tests are fundamental to determining conceptual separability and 
ultimately, copyrightability. Considering this acknowledgement, it is troublesome 
that the court did not implement the objective primary-subsidiary approach as its 
sole conceptual separability test. If it had done so, it would have been one step closer 
to simplifying this area of copyright law99 and creating clear precedent.
 Through its implementation and application of a hybrid approach for PGS works, 
the Varsity court made an unforced blunder that effectively prevented it from setting 
a cogent standard for conceptual separability in the Sixth Circuit. The court stated 
that “it is difficult to select one approach to the question whether an artistic design is 
conceptually separable from the utilitarian aspects of the article.”100 However, this 
difficulty is primarily evident when courts, like the Sixth Circuit, attempt to 
categorize all artistic designs into one group and apply a hybrid test. Such tests 
provide little guidance because it is unclear in any individual legal analysis whether 
all tests within the hybrid have equal influence.101 Courts must now grapple with the 
issue of how much weight to assign each element or test of the hybrid in any given 
case. Consequently, this tug-of-war approach adds to the subjectivity in the 
conceptual separability analysis because there are multiple factors that influence the 
application of any particular test to a case’s facts.
 Even more problematic for precedent is when hybrid tests are applied inconsistently 
within the same circuit.102 Legal standards exist to establish precedent and ensure 
96. Walker & Depoorter, supra note 18, at 353.
97. Supra note 41.
98. Varsity Brands, Inc. v. Star Athletica, LLC, 799 F.3d 468, 489 & n.11 (6th Cir. 2015) (citing Bleistein, 
188 U.S. at 251–52).
99. See id. at 496–97 (McKeague, J., dissenting).
It is apparent that either Congress or the Supreme Court (or both) must clarify 
copyright law with respect to garment design. The law in this area is a mess—and it has 
been for a long time. The majority takes a stab at sorting it out, and so do I. But until 
we get much-needed clarification, courts will continue to struggle and the business 
world will continue to be handicapped by the uncertainty of the law.
 Id. (citation omitted).
100. Id. at 487 (majority opinion).
101. See supra note 12.
102. The Second Circuit has made this error in conceptual separability analyses. See Jovani Fashion, Ltd. v. 
Fiesta Fashions, 500 F. App’x 42 (2d Cir. 2012) (employing a hybrid approach consisting of elements of 
the ordinary observer approach, the design-process approach, and the primary-subsidiary test); Chosun 
Int’l, Inc. v. Chrisha Creations, Ltd., 413 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2005) (employing a hybrid approach to 
conceptual separability consisting of elements of the objectively necessary approach, the design-process 
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predictability in the American justice system.103 Hybrid tests do not further this 
purpose when used inconsistently within the same jurisdiction. Although there is 
potential for courts to reach the same outcome applying different tests, the resulting 
uncertainty runs contrary to the aim of establishing consistent judicial precedent and 
makes it difficult for an artist to remain confident that her work will be protected.
 A single test for conceptual separability would alleviate conf lict and tension 
within the judicial system because it would make clear what test would apply to a 
given case, which would provide firm precedent and predictable outcomes.
 In light of the above policy considerations, it is unclear why the Sixth Circuit 
failed to endorse the primary-subsidiary test as its sole conceptual separability 
standard. It furthers the purpose of the Act because it provides greater protection to 
fabric designers.104 As many consumers purchase clothing with the purpose of 
appearing a certain way to others,105 the primary purpose of purchasing garments is 
more likely expressive than purely functional, and therefore fabric designs on 
garments would frequently be protected from infringement under the primary-
subsidiary test.106 This limited approach thus affords broader protection107 to clothing 
designers and encourages them to be creative.
 While the Sixth Circuit ultimately reached the proper conclusion, it erred when 
it created and applied a hybrid test to the conceptual separability analysis. Not only 
does this approach generate confusing precedent, but it is also contrary to the purpose 
of the Act. Had the Sixth Circuit endorsed the primary-subsidiary test alone and 
limited the scope of its application to fabric designs, the court would have reached 
the same result more efficiently while creating vibrant, bright-line precedent. Instead, 
the future of conceptual separability and the copyrightability of fabric designs 
remains in purgatory.
approach, and the ordinary observer approach); see also Walker & Depoorter, supra note 18, at 365–67 
(discussing the various conceptual separability tests inconsistently employed by the Second Circuit).
103. See Chad M. Oldfather, Universal De Novo Review, 77 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 308, 333 (2009).
A fundamental tenet of the American legal system is that like cases should be treated 
alike. . . . [U]niformity promotes predictability . . . . [C]onsistency in the resolution of 
cases promotes respect for the judiciary by strengthening the perception that judicial 
decisions are not inf luenced by political or other extralegal considerations.
 Id.
104. See supra pp. 250–52.
105. “Aesthetics of dress is about how people choose to appear, and the way they want to look to themselves 
and others within a particular context.” Marilyn DeLong, Aesthetics of Dress, Berg Fashion Library, 
https://www.bloomsburyfashioncentral.com/products/berg-fashion-library/article/bibliographical-
guides/aesthetics-of-dress (last visited Feb. 2, 2017).
106. See supra pp. 250–52.
107. Samuels, supra note 74, at 346.
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